

Delegation or Political Mobilization? Latino Access to the Bureaucracy

- Draft -

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Abstract

The paper builds on earlier research that demonstrates a strong relationship between local level electoral structures and Latino bureaucratic representation. This research suggests that over time, descriptive minority legislative representation leads to a greater minority presence in the bureaucracy, but that the *type* of election determines the magnitude and scope of bureaucratic representation. A question remains however, concerning the direction of influence. Do minority legislators delegate top-level bureaucratic responsibilities to minority agents, who in turn appoint more minorities to lower level positions (a top-down process)? Or, do minorities enter the bureaucracy at the lower levels and move their way up the organization through time, finally gaining access to legislative positions as they acquire organizational influence (a bottom-up process)? I attempt to disentangle the causal direction of this process by looking at school board, administrative, and teacher representation of Latinos in school districts of in Texas – across a nine-year period. The cross-sectional time series approach allows for some preliminary causality tests, and provides more leverage than previous studies concerning the direction (and magnitude of effects) of minority access to the bureaucracy.

Introduction

This study explores a simple question, “Where do Latino legislators and bureaucrats come from?” As minority populations increase over time, individuals gain access to jobs that had previously been denied to them; they become police officers, postal workers, soldiers, administrators, and teachers. Members of these minority groups also get elected to city councils, state legislatures, and local school boards. The difference between these two types of jobs – bureaucratic and legislative – is central to one of the key discussions in political science. Participants in this discussion study whether political control flows from elected officials to appointed bureaucrats, or whether control over policy works in the opposite direction.

Usually cast in terms of a principal-agent problem, the debate over who is in control of whom is important to democratic scholars because it speaks to what is meant by “representation.” Do officials (principals) who have been chosen through legitimate elections represent citizens? Or instead, do bureaucratic agents, who are appointed by the legislative process represent the public interest? There is a normative question here, “Who *should* represent the public interest?” But prior to this normative concern is whether the legislature or the bureaucracy *is* representing the public (and which portion of the public they are representing). The latter question is addressed in this paper.

The conflict between the political control literature and the bureaucratic representation literature is used to highlight the difficulty of characterizing different types of representation. Political control scholars are interested in mechanisms used by legislative actors to delegate and monitor bureaucratic activity. If bureaucratic agents are given too much discretion, they may decide to move policy towards their own preferences (which may differ significantly from the

preferences of the public and the legislature). If these bureaucratic agents are given too little discretion however, they may be constrained from producing policy outputs effectively or efficiently. The main argument of the political control camp is that legislative principals create incentive structures to control bureaucratic agents, and that agents respond to these incentives.

Scholars who are interested in the implementation of public policy however, argue that the story is not as clean as the political control side would have us believe. Policy scholars know full well that unelected bureaucratic agents can have a tremendous impact on policy once it enters the bureaucracy. Prior to this however, and key to the tension between these two camps, is what bureaucratic agents can do *before* the policy implementation stage. Perhaps the power of the bureaucrat stretches beyond the confines of their delegated responsibilities. These agents may be able to influence policy formation with their expertise, they may help set the legislative agenda, determine which standards will be used to judge their performance, or most intriguingly, they may be able to select their political masters. This last possibility is the concern of the current inquiry.

The utility of looking at minority bureaucratic and legislative infiltration is that it provides us a clear look at new policy preferences entering the political system over time. Minority groups often have different needs than majority populations, and thus the successful translation of these preferences into policy can be measured. For example, many Latino students require (and their parents request) bilingual education programs to increase the chances of academic success in public school. Over time, we can observe the increasing demand for these types of programs as the Latino student population grows. Once a bilingual program is created in the school district, we can mark the political success of a distinct group with a certain set of

preferences. Minority politics gives the political control literature the ability to clearly track the movement of policy preferences into outputs and outcomes over time. Studying the growth of minority populations (particularly Latino populations) over time in the U.S. can contribute significantly to the debate on how individuals (and groups) achieve political control over public policy.

Education policy is the area of interest for this paper for a number of reasons. First, education is a highly salient issue in the Latino community. If one is looking for minority policy influence over time, it is prudent to begin with a policy area that is important to group members. Secondly, the U.S. education system is very decentralized, allowing low resource groups and individuals to enter the local legislature and bureaucracy more easily than in other policy areas. The amount of minority representation in education is much greater than what would be expected in more centralized policy areas. Thirdly, education is an area crucial to the socialization of new groups. That is, apart from its issue salience, public education is one of the main mechanisms through which new groups interact with government. It is here where a group's political, social, and economic future is created and lost. If a representation gap exists in public education, the effects can, over time, manifest themselves in many other domains. For these reasons we would expect to find much more variation on the phenomena of interest for this study (which have to do with a Latino presence in the system).

The paper is a response to previous work on Latino representation in the education system (Meier and Gonzalez Juenke 2003). In that work, my co-author and I find substantial structural impacts on Latino policy outcomes (a top-down, political control mechanism). We demonstrate that a small difference in how local school board members are elected leads to large differences

in descriptive and substantive representation for Latinos in Texas. The findings raise more questions than they answer however, as the cross-sectional design does not tell us about the direction of influence. This is the central concern of the research presented here.

The question posed in the opening returns, “Where do Latino legislators and bureaucrats come from?” Do they arise from a mobilization of bureaucratic agents who gain enough numbers and expertise to break into the legislative theater (a bottom up phenomenon)? Or instead, do Latinos (and other minorities) gain policy access through the electoral system first, then use their political control to create opportunities for Latino bureaucrats (including the recruitment of more Latinos to the system)?

I examine this question in the following manner. I begin with a general discussion of the tension between the political control and bureaucratic representation literatures. The paper speaks primarily to those who are interested in the pressures that exist between these two sub-fields. Next, I explore how this debate informs different perspectives on representation. How do various scholars define representation and what is the role of the different branches of government in representing citizens? Lastly, I describe the research that spawned the current study. The findings presented in this previous work created more questions than they answered, and generated a number of new testable hypotheses. This last theoretical section explores why the question of causality is important to minority scholars and policy researchers alike.

After covering the theoretical underpinnings of the research, I begin to discuss why it is advantageous to study minority education policy at the level of the school district. In this section I speak to the specific characteristics of education policy, and in particular, school boards, that lend themselves to appropriate tests of the hypotheses. Next I clarify the hypotheses to be tested,

and describe the data that will be used to carry out the tests. The data include student, teacher, administrative, and school board representation of Latinos in Texas nine-year period in the 1990's. I clarify the design of the data analysis to highlight the increased empirical power of causality tests using time series. After interpreting the results of these empirical tests, I explain how a richer set of data and more sophisticated tests will improve our understanding of the implications drawn from this preliminary exploration. I conclude by placing this study within a broad theoretical context, that of legislative and bureaucratic representation. If we can discover how new interests get their preferences turned into policy over time, we travel a long way towards finding out where political control originates from, and whether it is legislators or bureaucrats who wield greater command in the policy process.

Political Control of Whom?

The authors who study the “political control of the bureaucracy,” have a view of the bureaucracy grounded in the law. That is to say, they recognize the *constitutional* and *representative* part of our system that many others forget, and assume that administrative power flows from elected officials to public agencies. They argue that the people are represented by elected officials, not by the bureaucracy (Fiorina 1981; Calvert et al. 1989; McCubbins 1991;).

The most robust line of political control theory and analysis comes from the legislative and presidential literature. In general, the authors of the most recent scholarship in this area share a set of assumptions about political actors and their relationship with the bureaucracy: 1) People are intendedly rational and are interested in satisficing their preferences, 2) Politicians are interested in getting re-elected (satisficing votes) and thus align their preferences with interests

that will assist them in doing so, and 3) the legislative-bureaucracy relationship can be modeled as a principal-agent relationship respectively (and importantly, not the other way around); this is the relationship the Constitution sets up. The third assumption is the key to the normative bent this group of authors share. Borrowing from earlier work in organizational theory and decision theory (Barnard 1938, Simon 1947, Cyert and March 1987 (1959), Williamson 1995), agency theory models the legislative-administrative relationship as a hierarchical contract between two actors (Fredrickson and Smith 2003, 37; Wood and Waterman 1994).

This differentiates the work from the earlier politics/administration dichotomy because it acknowledges the preferences, goals and power of the bureaucrat. The public agent has its own values, its unique expertise, its ability to signal (or mischaracterize its “type”), and its preference to shirk (Brehm and Gates 1997) that make it difficult for the legal principal to simply give away broad discretion (Calvert et al. 1989; McCubbins 1991; Mcnollgast 1989; Moe 1995; Wood and Waterman 1994; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). Because of this, principals must design either ex-post or ex-ante constraints that will diminish bureaucratic drift (indeed, they must decide whether to delegate authority to the agent in the first place). To this end, Bendor and Moe (1985, 772) define the role of the bureaucracy in a democracy by concluding “The power of bureaus to get what they want has been exaggerated.” Other authors of this genre would similarly argue that whatever decision-making ability an agency appears to have has been “abdicated” (Kiewet and McCubbins 1991 as quoted in Whittington and Carpenter 2003, 496), given away under tight restraints that largely prevent true bureaucratic “discretion.”

Of course this has not gone over well with public policy scholars, and for good reasons. Much of the work in the political control literature is done by political scientists and not public

administration researchers, possibly explaining some of the bias towards political explanations. Public administration scholars point out that political control advocates have drifted from their own models and ignored the “agent” side of agency theory (Moe 2002; Meier et al 2003). Although the bureaucracy has no explicit Constitutional legitimacy (West 1995, 176), as a creation of the legitimate political process the public agent has a legal and fundamental role in the policy process (Wood and Waterman 1994, 127). If indeed authority has been abdicated, it has been abdicated in the public interest in line with the Constitution, and these actors serve a significant political function in a democracy.

Bureaucratic and Legislative Representation

Representation is the key goal of democratic governments. But what exactly do scholars mean when we talk about representation? Who is responsible for representation – the legislature, the courts, or the bureaucracy? In terms of majority and minority populations, who is accountable to racial and ethnic minorities? Scholars have grappled with these concepts for centuries but we have few answers, not only in normative terms, but also within a positive framework (Dunn 1999, 316). The labyrinth of the modern separated powers system, in conjunction with a changing racial and ethnic demographic in the United States leaves the question of representation open to interpretation.

This study is focused on the representation of Latino policy preferences in the local legislature and bureaucracy. As with many policy areas, a mix of elected and unelected officials “represent” the interests of students and parents. Elections hold school board members accountable to the public (Manin et al. 1999), but this allows untrained, uninformed citizens to

control local policy. Relative to district administrators and teachers, many of whom have been in the system ten to twenty years, the average school board member is at a distinct disadvantage (Chubb and Moe 1990, Dunn 1999). Bureaucrats have experience, expertise, information advantages, and most importantly discretion (Moe 1995; Fredrickson and Smith 2003). The decentralized nature of the U.S. education system allows for individuals who have little to no experience with education to win legitimate control over these bureaucratic “experts.”

This situation is wrought with tension. Teachers and administrators who have spent their lives learning about what is best for students, come face to face with less qualified (but more “legitimate”) political masters (the public, as represented by the school board). When a new racial group enters the system with different needs and preferences than those of the majority, the decision about what is best for these students is often left up to majority representatives (either in the legislature or the bureaucracy). For Latinos, this has historically spelled disaster. Most of the evidence concerning discrimination against Latino students in the areas of ability tracking, discipline, college preparation, testing, bilingual education, and special education assignment has come at the hands of Anglo majority school boards, administrators, and teachers (Meier and Stewart 1990; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000) Because of this, many Latino parents and voters with policy preferences that concentrate on the education gap between Latinos and other racial groups, use race and ethnicity as a voting cue to select representatives that will deliver resources to their minority constituency (Bullock 1984; Eisinger 1980).

The legislature and the bureaucracy offer two different kinds of representation. Wood and Waterman (1994) point out that the longer tenure of bureaucratic agents (along with their other organizational advantages) allows them to ride out policy churn (Hess 1999) and legislative

fads. Their discretion can oftentimes be used to buffer the public system from legislative shocks (Wood and Waterman 1994, 127). In this sense, the bureaucracy can become an advocate for minority groups that are not being properly represented by the legislature. Latinos who are being ignored by elected district officials (whose constituency is often the median, majority voter) may find their policy preferences represented by Latino administrators and teachers in the school. Latino teachers often discipline and track Latino students differently than Anglo teachers (Meier and Stewart 1990, 16-18). Also, Latino bureaucrats can be advocates for policy change in their interaction with the school board, forcing elected officials to choose between the desires of the voting majority and the expertise of district employees.

An alternative perspective suggests that the bureaucracy can be *less* representative of minority populations than locally elected school boards. Oftentimes, public organizations move slowly in terms of “responsiveness” because they are not held “accountable” to the public through elections (Dahl 1971; Manin et al. 1999). These two facets of representation can be mapped onto the bureaucratic and legislative aspects of government. As I argued above, many times the bureaucracy responds to the needs of clientele before the legislature can. An increasing presence of Latino teachers and administrators in a school district can move policy towards the needs of a minority population before formal policy change occurs at the legislative level. However, because legislators are accountable to the public every few years in elections, it is also possible that legislative representation may precede a bureaucratic response. Latino legislators may enter the policy process and push for more bilingual education programs, a greater emphasis on the recruitment of Latino teachers and administrators, and even advocate the hiring of a Latino superintendent to lead the district in a new direction. Under this scenario, the legislature is more

responsive because of its accountability to the public (and perhaps because of electoral mechanisms that favor the election of minority candidates). These different conceptions of representation mirror the discussion between political control and bureaucratic representation scholars.

Motivation of the Research


The current study stems from previous work on the bureaucratic outcomes of school board elections (Meier et al. 2003; Meier and Gonzalez Juenke 2003). These studies demonstrate that ward elections (single member district elections) produce more Latino school board members, and more importantly, that these Latino legislators are associated with the hiring of Latino administrators and teachers. The findings suggest a “top-down” flow of policy control.

Underpinning these results is a theory that borrows logic from the median voter theorem. The electoral structure (ward vs. at-large) creates incentives for candidates and office-holders in response to different minority and majority constituencies. The institutional structure induces Latino school board members to *behave* differently, depending on which system was used to select them. Latinos elected by at-large systems will not feel the need to push as hard for Latino policy outcomes, while those elected using ward systems have the ability (or face the constraint) to be greater advocates for Latino policy preferences. By bringing in more Latino administrators (superintendents, principals, assistant principals, etc.) these districts are also associated with more Latino teachers (all else equal). Finally, the work connects the presence of Latino teachers to a number of student outcome indicators, finding that in most cases, the presence of Latino teachers benefits Latino students.

Figure 1 presents the theoretical story of this previous research. Political control flows from institutional mechanisms, to *elected* officials, then to *unelected* bureaucrats, down to the clientele. The cross-sectional design of these previous studies provides suggestive evidence of top-down, institutional explanations for the hiring of Latinos to the bureaucracy, and also for increased Latino student performance. Thus, the answer to the question, “Where do Latino legislators and bureaucrats come from” is apparently answered: Latino legislators appear to come (disproportionately) from ward electoral structures, and Latino bureaucrats come from policy change at the school board level that seeks to recruit more Latino administrators and teachers to the district.

The process seems fairly straightforward, however, the cross-sectional design does not tell the whole story. Perhaps, Latino school board members do not come from the general public, but are instead former teachers or administrators with preferences that differ tremendously from the public. In a different scenario, Latinos could also win a legislative seat with only the support of district teachers and administrators (Moe 2002). In this scenario, the democratic process is turned on its head. Unelected bureaucrats select and control their political masters, giving them almost complete influence over the direction of district policy. Figure 2 tells this version of the story. Here, political control flows upwards, from the expertise and information of the bureaucratic agents, to the choice of elected officials and even, perhaps, the choice of electoral structure.

Figure 1. “Top Down” Political Control




In order to test for these effects, we need to analyze observations across space *and* time. The research question can now be restated in this way – “Who came first, Latino legislators or Latino bureaucrats?” Thus, the research design *must* involve data over time. This allows us to demonstrate whether legislators create opportunities for the advancement of minority bureaucrats or whether bureaucrats help create opportunities for Latino elected officials. This is an important question for researchers from many fields, including representation scholars, implementation scholars, and political control theorists.

A study by Meier and Smith (1994) in fact looks at the causal question in the Florida education system between the years 1980 and 1989, and finds that Black representation works in *both* directions. The presence of Black bureaucrats increases legislative representation in later years, and the presence of Black legislative representation, in turn, increases the likelihood of Blacks in the bureaucracy (Meier and Smith 1994). This study provides a good template for how to conduct similar research using a larger sample for a different racial group – Latinos. The importance of the present work however is that it is theoretically situated between two divergent perspectives concerning representation. Also, the explosive growth of the U.S. Latino population over the last decade makes the current examination much more timely, and provides a greater amount of variation on the variables of interest (for the period under examination).

Ideally we would like to measure the preferences of legislators, the public, and bureaucrats in each district over time. Lacking this survey data however, it becomes prudent to use indicators of these phenomena. Keeping in line with the research that generated the questions in this paper, I propose to observe the presence or absence of Latinos in the legislature, bureaucracy, and clientele in each school district in Texas and California. This process provides

Figure 2. “Bottom Up” Influence



a limited but powerful look at who shows up first in the policy system, and what the effects of this representational presence are for Latinos in the other branches of government. Using proxy measures of Latino preferences affects the interpretation of the results, as well as the strength of the evidence that can be presented, but this is a first attempt at testing the competing theories and will provide an indication of what further data analysis may tell us.

The district level of analysis is crucial to questions of representation because this is where local education policy is made, and this is the level at which elections are conducted. School board elections are ubiquitous in the United States, providing a rich, if ignored, data source. These boards are filled using a multitude of variable structures (at-large, modified at-large, by ward, cumulative voting, partisan, non-partisan, etc.), creating a great deal of variation in the amount of Latino representation we will observe across districts and across states. Secondly, it is at the district (not school) level where we will observe the effects of the interaction of district and school administrators to create programs for Latino students, and to bring more Latino teachers to the district. Lastly, I propose to examine district data because this is the primary entity held accountable for student and school performance. It is here where the state aggregates its command of the education system, so it is here where we should look for indicators of policy shift.

The theoretical discussion suggests the following hypotheses:

Top-down

H₁ As Latino representation increases on the school board, we will observe an increase in Latino administrative representation, all else equal.

H_{1A} As Latino representation increases on the school board, we will observe an increase in Latino teacher representation, all else equal.

Bottom-up

H₂ As Latino administrative representation increases, we will observe an increase in Latino school board representation, all else equal.

H_{2A} As Latino teacher representation increases, we will observe an increase in Latino school board representation, all else equal.

Control Hypotheses

H₃ As the percentage of Latino students increases, Latino representation on the school board and in the bureaucracy will increase, all else equal.

H₄ As the percentage of potential Latino voters increases, Latino school board representation will increase, all else equal.

H₅ As income and education increase, Latino legislative and bureaucratic representation will increase, all else equal.

Data and Methods

The data for the preliminary analyses come from school districts in Texas. This state is one of the primary political arenas in which Latinos have fought to gain representation, and it presents good test cases for the phenomena under investigation. It is here where we would expect Latinos to have made the largest gains in the legislative and bureaucratic domains. In

Texas school districts, Latino bureaucratic and school board representation average around ten percent during the 1990's (see the appendix for descriptive statistics of the data). The period under investigation is the 1990's because the data are available and because it is during this period that the Latino population saw substantial increases.

The variables of interest include the following:

School board representation: The % of Latinos on the school board – survey data from the Project of Equity Representation and Governance (PERG), the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), and the U.S. Census Bureau.

Administrative representation: The % of Latino superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals, and assistant principals in the district – survey data from PERG and the Texas Education Agency.

Teacher representation: The % of Latino teachers – survey data from PERG, the Texas Education Agency, and the National Center for Education Statistics (Common Core Data).

Student characteristics: % Latino students, % Black students, and % low income students - the National Center for Education Statistics (Common Core Data).

Population Characteristics: % Latino voting age population, average family income, and average educational attainment – National Center for Education Statistics (School District Demographics).

Time Frame: The years 1993 to 2001. The pool will encompass over one thousand school districts for the nine-year period. The pool will include just the first and last years of the time frame.

The analysis proceeds in two steps. In order to get a picture of the changes from 1993 to 2001, a type of Granger causality test will be performed on one variable at a time while controlling for the other factors (Gujarati 2003, 696-702; Greene 2003, 592-593). We want to know if the presence of Latinos in one area of the policy process at time $t - 8$ will lead to greater representation in other branches at time t . After accounting for the amount of Latino representation we would expect given our control variables at time t , I include a *lagged* explanatory variable to see if it can explain any of the remaining variation.

The entire data pool (the intervening years) is not used because the breadth (over 1,000 districts) is far bigger than the depth (9 years of data), and it would be impractical to look for time effects in such a pool. Thus, a lag of eight years, using the first and last years of the data, is included in the models for two reasons. First, ideally we would want data from as far back as possible to look for effects across time, but the data availability of Latino administrators in Texas limits the set to the 1993-1994 school year. This data limitation, however, is quite helpful for testing the theory at hand. The 1990's is a period of population expansion for Latinos across the country, and especially in Texas. The Latino student population in the average district increases from 25 percent to 30 percent in this short time period, and Latino representation in the legislature and bureaucracy show similar increases on average (see the appendix for more information on these changes).

Thus, the models use data from 1993, near the beginning of this expansion, to explain what we observe in 2001. For example, in the first model (which corresponds with H_1), teacher representation in 2001 is a function of school board representation in 1993, teacher representation in 1993, administrative representation in 1993, and the other control variables for

2001. We would expect the percent of Latino teachers in 1993 to dominate the equation, but the hypothesis states that school board representation should also be a significant predictor. By comparing the results of model 1 with model 3, we can get a good indication of the direction of the causality (Gujarati 2003). If school board representation in 1993 predicts teacher representation in 2001 (model 1), but teacher representation in 1993 does *not* explain school board representation in 2001 (model 3), we have (preliminary) evidence of “top-down” causality. The primary models can be characterized in the following manner:

Model 1

$$LADMIN_{2001} = b_1LSBR_{1993} + b_2LADMIN_{1993} + b_3LTEACH_{1993} + b_4LPUP_{2001} + \text{sum of effects for control variables} + \text{error term.}$$

Model 2

$$LTEACH_{2001} = b_1LSBR_{1993} + b_2TEACH_{1993} + b_3LADMIN_{1993} + b_4LPUP_{2001} + \text{sum of effects for control variables} + \text{error term.}$$

Model 3

$$LSBR_{2001} = b_1LSBR_{1993} + b_2TEACH_{1993} + b_3LADMIN_{1993} + b_4LPUP_{2001} + \text{sum of effects for control variables} + \text{error term.}$$

Where:

- LSBR – Latino school board representation
- LADMIN – Latino administrative representation
- LTEACH – Latino teacher representation
- LPUP – Latino student population

The same comparison method can be used for the other hypotheses. It is just as likely that the analysis will reveal “bottom-up” influence from the bureaucracy to the legislature, and it is also possible that effects will be found in both directions. That is, as Meier and Smith (1994) argue, perhaps representation is a two-way street, with bureaucrats increasing the opportunities for legislators, and legislators in turn increasing the likelihood of greater bureaucratic representation. The tension between the political control and bureaucratic representation literatures makes it very likely that a two-way influence is taking place, but the evidence should help clarify the issue.

Results and Analysis

I use OLS regression to estimate the models and include a dummy variable to indicate when the school board is majority Latino. This binary variable is interacted with Latino representation on the board to test for the majority power of Latino boards. Because substantive policy change is more likely to occur when Latinos make up a majority of the legislature, this interaction should detect any effects.

The first three tables match the three formal models from the previous section respectively. Coefficient magnitude estimates are not of interest in these models because of the presence of the lagged dependent variables, so instead I present the sign and significance of the independent variables. The lagged dependent variables create extremely tough tests for the other variables because it is expected that they will explain the majority of the variation in the dependent variable. We are interested in questions of (granger) causality, not necessarily the magnitude of effects. Lastly, robust standard errors are reported in all of the tables.

In the interest of clarity and space, I will summarize the results in a brief format:

Table 1 (note, other control variables are not displayed):

- 1) After controlling for % Latino administrators in 1993, and % Latino Teachers in 1993 (both of which perform as expected), a Latino *minority* board contributes nothing to the explanation of % Latino administrators in 2001. Latino *majority* boards however (the combination of the interaction terms), produce an overall positive and significant effect on the remaining administration variation.
- 2) In districts that had no Latino administrative representation in 1993, the majority Latino board variables produce their largest impacts.
- 3) In districts that had some Latino administrative representation in 1993, Latino majority school boards have a (weakly) significant impact on administrative representation in 2001.

Table 2:

- 1) After controlling for % Latino administrators in 1993, and % Latino Teachers in 1993 (both of which perform as expected), Latino school board representation has a significant and positive impact on the % of Latino teachers observed in 2001.
- 2) There is no added benefit of being a Latino majority school board (the interaction is not significant).
- 3) The majority of the effect for Latinos on school boards seems to be coming in districts that had below average teacher representation in 1993. That is, for districts that were below average (the equivalent of “0” for administrators, since there were very few

districts with no Latino teachers in 1993), Latino school board members were positively and significantly associated with increases in teacher representation in 2001.

Table 3:


- 1) After controlling for % Latino school board representation in 1993 (which performs as expected), neither Latino bureaucratic representation variable has a significant impact on the % of Latino school board members observed in 2001.
- 2) This is not a fair test, since there is little to no change in the board representation across the 8-year period. This is understandable because if there are two Latino seats on a school board, there does not need to be an increase or decrease in the level of representation over time for policy change to occur. This leaves little variation to be explained by the other variables. Thus the other results in this table are more telling.
- 3) % Latino teachers in 1993 is associated with increases in school board representation in 2001 in districts that had at least *some* Latino representation in 1993.
- 4) Neither bureaucratic variable significantly explains Latino school board representation in 2001, in districts that had no board representation in 1993 (most of these remain zero across the 8-year period)

Figure 3

- 1) Figure three displays all of these results together. School board representation is positively associated with administrative and teacher representation, although, only a majority Latino board has any impact on administrators. For teachers, any amount of board representation is significant.

- 2) Teacher and administrative representation is extremely endogenous, however we find many more districts with some Latino teachers and no Latino administrators, telling us that Latino teacher representation approaches what might be called a *necessary* but not sufficient condition for administrative representation.
- 3) Latino administrators are *never* associated with increased school board representation.
- 4) Latino teachers are (weakly) associated with increased school board representation. This is interesting given the strong tests presented here, and the small amount of variation in the dependent variable.

Figure 3. Summary of Findings: Endogenous Change



Discussion

Representation is a tricky concept in a democracy with separated powers. Democracy is identifiable mainly through the ability of its citizens to choose representatives in competitive and fair elections. Whatever happens after the election is supposed to be corrected through the electoral process again at a later time. The bureaucracy, the administrative state, is largely accountable to these chosen representatives, and thus theoretically has no “legitimate” representational purpose. As political control scholars contend, elected officials create institutional mechanisms that monitor and control bureaucratic activity. But the unelected official’s expertise and information advantages create a much more complicated system of political control than the ideal democratic form.

Public administration and public policy scholars have repeatedly found evidence of an active and representational role for the bureaucracy. These unelected officials use their organizational and clientele knowledge to shift policy away from legislative intent whenever it serves their preferences. Sometimes, this policy drift can benefit groups who are underrepresented at the ballot box, and other times it can severely hinder minority policy outcomes. The tension between these two possibilities marks a clear opportunity for researchers to contribute evidence of these processes in a variety of settings.

The public education setting is an excellent policy area to observe potential “top-down” or “bottom-up” causal mechanisms because of its issue salience and its decentralized nature in the United States. As one of the most decentralized policy processes, the capability of bureaucrats to influence local legislators is great. If we do not find bottom-up effects in this particular area, it is hard to imagine that they exist in many others. In conjunction with this, I

focus on minority group preferences and outcomes over time because they allow us to observe how new preferences and resource needs work their way through the policy process from beginning to end.

The design I use in this paper builds on previous evidence that supports a “top-down” political control story. The problem with this earlier research however, is that its cross-sectional design does not allow us to look for directional effects. It is not at all clear whether school board members create the potential for greater bureaucratic representation, or whether the process works in reverse. The simplified Granger causality tests presented here go a long way to answering some of these directional ambiguities.

Returning to the question that opens the paper, “Where do Latino legislators and bureaucrats come from?” we can see how these tests lead us to some preliminary answers. Policy control in Texas school districts in the 1990’s seems to *start* at the bottom. That is, street level representation (the presence of Latino teachers) appears to be a necessary condition for administrative and school board representation. The policy power of the school board, however, is the story of this paper. The evidence demonstrates that school board representation is consistently associated with bureaucratic representation (although the mechanisms differ for teachers and administrators). Policy control, for the most part (and once Latino teachers have made inroads), flows from elected officials to representative bureaucratic agents. We can say that elected Latinos are responsible for the increase in Latino bureaucratic representation over time, but that their place at the table is set by street level bureaucrats.

The data and tests displayed here do not go far enough. A longer time period (for which there are scant data) and data from more states would provide a better picture. These data are

currently being collected for a number of states with growing Latino populations. The tests can be improved by considering a more specific measure of representational change. For example, looking at the *changes* in bureaucratic and legislative representation over time, instead of the absolute levels at time t and $t - 8$ might generate more interesting evidence. Each of these possibilities is under formulation, but in the absence of better data and more precise modeling, the evidence presented here is very suggestive of what might be expected.

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Table 1. Explaining Latino Administrative Representation: 1993 – 2001

Dependent Variable: % Administrators in the District who are Latino (in 2001-02)

	Latino Administrators in 1993-04?		
	All Districts	YES	NO
Independent Variables¹			
% Latino Admin. (1993)	+ **
% Latino Teachers (1993)	+ **	+ **	+ **
% Latino Board Members (1993)	+	+	+
<i>Interaction</i>			
Latino Majority Board (1993)	+ *	+ ⁰	— **
% Latino on Majority Board (1993)	— *	—	+ **
<i>Overall Effect of Interaction</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>positive</i>
Number of Cases	985	200	785
R ²	.85	.84	.25
F	268.54**	167.28**	15.21**

** <.01 probability, * <.05 probability, ⁰ <.10 probability. All models estimated using STATA 7 using Huber-White robust standard errors.

¹ All models include (2001) controls for % Latino students, % Latino population in district, % non-citizens, % Latinos with a high school diploma, and total enrollment. In the interest of clarity, I do not report these results here.

Table 2. Explaining Latino Teacher Representation: 1993 – 2001

Dependent Variable: % Teachers in the District who are Latino (in 2001-02)

Above Avg. % Latino Teachers in 93-04?

	All Districts	YES	NO
Independent Variables			
% Latino Teachers (1993)	+ **
% Latino Admin. (1993)	+ **	+ **	+ **
% Latino Board Members (1993)	+ ⁰	+	+ **
Interaction			
Latino Majority Board (1993)	+	—	...
% Latino on Majority Board (1993)	—	+	...
<i>Overall Effect of Interaction</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	...
Number of Cases	987	153	834
R ²	.97	.87	.58
F	1226.85**	132.39**	70.74**

** <.01 probability, * <.05 probability, ⁰ <.10 probability. All models estimated using STATA 7 using Huber-White robust standard errors.

Table 3. Explaining Latino School Board Representation: 1993 - 2001

Dependent Variable: % of School Board Members who are Latino (in 2001-02)

Any Latinos on School Board in 93-04?

	All Districts	YES	NO
Independent Variables²			
% Latino Teachers (1993)	—	+ *	+
% Latino Admin. (1993)	—	+	+
% Latino Board Members (1993)	+ **
Number of Cases	987	244	743
R ²	.91	.52	.22
F	585.63**	25.79**	6.47**

** <.01 probability, * <.05 probability, ⁰ <.10 probability. All models estimated using STATA 7 using Huber-White robust standard errors.

² Other controls not presented.

Table 4. Explaining Latino Administrative Representation Change:1993 - 2001

Dependent Variable: Change in % Administrators in the District who are Latino (1993-2001)

	All Districts	No Latino Administrators in 1993-04
Independent Variables³		
% Latino Board Members (1993)	+	—
Latino Majority Board (1993)	+ **	— **
% Latino on Majority Board (1993)	— *	+ **
<i>Overall Effect of Interaction</i>	<i>mostly positive</i>	<i>mostly positive</i>
Number of Cases	985	785
R ²	.28	.30
F	10.23**	28.24**

** <.01 probability, * <.05 probability, ⁰ <.10 probability. All models estimated using STATA 7 using Huber-White robust standard errors.

³ Other controls not presented.

Table 5. Explaining Latino Teacher Representation Change: 1993 - 2001

Dependent Variable: Change in % Teachers in the District who are Latino (1993-2001)

Above Avg. % Latino Teachers in 93-04?

	All Districts	NO
Independent Variables⁴		
% Latino Board Members (1993)	+	+ **
Latino Majority Board (1993)	+	...
% Latino on Majority Board (1993)	—	...
<i>Overall Effect of Interaction</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>positive</i>
Number of Cases	985	832
R ²	.44	.24
F	29.09**	15.67**

** <.01 probability, * <.05 probability, ⁰ <.10 probability. All models estimated using STATA 7 using Huber-White robust standard errors.

⁴ Other controls not presented.

Appendix: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
% Latino Teachers ('93)	1046	7.40	17.31	0	96.5
% Latino Teachers ('01)	1220	11.03	21.24	0	100
Change in Teachers	1040	1.98	4.66	-22.1	35.3
% Latino Admin. ('93)	1029	7.66	20.85	0	100
% Latino Admin. ('01)	1207	10.56	24.05	0	100
Change in Admin.	1024	2.14	10.04	-57.1	100
% Latino on Board ('93)	1035	8.67	19.97	0	100
% Latino on Board ('01)	1035	8.12	19.21	0	100
% Latino Students ('01)	1220	30.78	27.86	0	100
% Latino Population ('00)	1013	22.59	23.98	0	99
% Latino Non-Citizens ('00)	1008	19.05	14.85	0	100
% Latinos Below Poverty ('00)	1008	25.33	15.28	0	100
% Latinos w/ H.S. Diploma ('00)	1004	48.27	19.16	0	100
District Enrollment ('01)	1015	3,756	11,371	19	210k