

**¡Muéstreme el Dinero!: Assessing the Linkage Between Latino School  
Superintendents and English Language Learner Program Resources**

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## **Abstract**

Theories of bureaucratic representation argue that passive representation will lead to active representation. Research over the last 20 years continues to support this argument by finding evidence that diverse organizations improve policy outcomes for represented groups. Although scholars argue that this evidence supports the contention that passive representation leads to active representation, there are other plausible explanations for these results. This is largely due to the fact that inferences about individual behavior are being made from aggregate data. This study aims to take a closer look at active representation by looking at effect of an individual, Latino school superintendents, on policy outputs, resources for English language learner programs. I find that districts with Latino superintendents do divert more resources toward Limited English proficient students. This, I argue, offers stronger evidence of active representation compared to past research on bureaucratic representation.

## **Introduction**

A growing body of research finds that bureaucratic representation improves outcomes for represented clientele. Increases in minority teachers lead to increases in minority student performance (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999), police forces with more women are more responsive to rape allegations (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2002), representative EEOC offices are more responsive to minority complaints (Hindera 1993) and minority FHA loan applicants are more likely to receive loans from FHA offices with minority employees (Selden 1997). All of these works suggest that improved outcomes are a function of active representation. That is, minority bureaucrats are utilizing discretion in their roles in order to act on behalf of minority clientele. Missing in this literature, though, is direct evidence that improved outcomes are a function of active representation, and what role, if any, do upper-level administrators play in actively representing minority clientele.

Research presented in this study will address the first shortcoming by directly linking a policy output to an individual. Up to now, evidence of active representation has come from aggregate level analysis, linking the percentage of minority bureaucrats with policy outcomes for minority clientele. Although active representation could produce the results cited above, it is quite possible that other factors, or a combination of factors, are producing improved outcomes for represented groups. Improved outcomes could be a function of minority clientele reacting differently to representative agencies. It is also possible that diverse organizations lead to non-minority bureaucrats becoming sensitized to minority needs and interests through interaction with minority bureaucrats. It is

possible, then, that improved minority outcomes are a function of different actions by non-minorities. Although research on bureaucratic representation shows that represented groups benefit from diverse organizations, it is still unclear whether this benefit is a function of active representation or other processes.

Instead of analyzing the effect of aggregate levels of representation on policy outcomes, analysis presented in this study links an individual, a school superintendent, and policy decisions, the level of resources for bilingual education programs. This research differs from past research in two important ways, which together allow for direct test of active representation. First, by focusing on the action of an individual, not an aggregation of individuals, I will avoid potential ecological fallacies. That is, any measured effect of representation will likely be a function of the individual, not others within an organization. Second, by focusing on policy outputs, instead of policy outcomes, the results will be free of behavioral responses by represented clientele.

In addition to directly testing active representation, this study will also contribute to the literature on bureaucratic representation by focusing on representation by upper-level managers. Several authors (Meier 1993; Saltzstein 1979; Thompson 1976) have suggested that active representation is more likely to occur at the street level, due to organizational influence and proximity to minority clientele. Most evidence of active representation has been found by linking street-level bureaucratic representation to improved policy outcomes for represented groups (Naff 2001). Lack of evidence, though, should not be taken as evidence that representation only occurs from below. Past methods of studying active representation, specifically linking representation to outcomes, makes it difficult to find evidence that upper-level managers represent certain groups. This is

especially the case if representation at the street level is a necessary condition for improved policy outcomes. By directly testing an output that is not a function of decisions or actions or street-level bureaucrat, I will be able to better assess the ability of upper-level managers to represent certain groups.

The next section discusses the literature on representation and bilingual education. Specifically, I will focus on the qualities of bilingual education that make it an ideal policy for studying bureaucratic representation. The following section discusses the data and methods used in this study. Following this section I discuss the results and what they say about bureaucratic representation.

## **Representation and Bilingual Education**

### *An Ideal policy for the study of bureaucratic representation*

As several authors have noted (Meier 1993; Saltzstein 1979; Thompson 1976), part of the difficulty in assessing linkages between passive and active representation is finding a policy where there is a clear distinction in policy preferences associated with race, or a policy that largely affects one group. One such policy area, though, are English language learner (ELL) programs which are geared toward limited English proficient (LEP) students. These programs include bilingual, English as a second language (ESL) and structured immersion programs. In this policy area policy preferences vary by race, and there are asymmetrical benefits for one group, Latinos.

Admittedly, there is some debate concerning support for bilingual education by Latinos. Opponents of bilingual education argue that Latinos do not support bilingual education (see Krashen 1996). Instead, they claim that Latinos are in favor of programs that help ESL students quickly acquire English skills, such as with structured immersion

programs. Ron Unz, the person behind Proposition 227 in California, often cited polls that indicated that 81% of Latinos favor English immersion programs over bilingual programs.

Krashen (1996) argues that polls that show that Latinos are against bilingual education frame bilingual education with a negative bias. These surveys tend to frame bilingual programs as teaching Spanish instead of being a tool for English acquisition. Although not all Latinos believe that LEP students need to maintain their native language, there is nearly unanimous agreement that LEP students need to learn English. Any survey questions, then, that frames bilingual programs as hindering English language acquisition will likely lead to responses indicating disfavor for these programs among the Latino community. Without the negative bias, however, there is clear support for bilingual education among the Latino community (De la Garza 1992; Krashen 1996; Shin 2000). There also is little or no difference in support among different groups within the Latino community, such as Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans etc. (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996).<sup>1</sup> The strong support for bilingual education within the Latino community makes this a suitable policy for finding evidence of active representation.

Even if Latinos are not strongly in favor of bilingual education, it is still reasonable to expect that they would be more likely to support devoting resources toward programs for ESL students, whether the resources are for bilingual, ESL or structured immersion programs. The reason for expecting that Latinos would be more likely to favor devoting resources toward ELL programs is that no other group is as affected by the consequences of these programs. Nation-wide, 74% of all LEP students are Latino

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<sup>1</sup> Polls also suggest the Asians have about the same level of support for bilingual education as Latinos.

(Feinberg 2002). Data from Texas show that 92% of LEP students in Texas school districts are Latino. This policy area's asymmetric benefits, along with clear differences in policy preferences, makes it an ideal policy for the study of representation.

Of course, in order for this policy area to be appropriate for the study of bureaucratic representation, bureaucrats must be able to exercise some discretion over the policy area. Although decisions regarding resource levels for bilingual education are constrained by federal, state and local elected bodies, educational bureaucracies still exercise control over program resources. Superintendents, in particular, not only make decisions regarding the level of resources devoted toward bilingual programs, they also advise school boards on budgetary matters (Norton 1996).

In addition to having discretion over decisions regarding resources for this policy area, organizational influences in the public school system should enhance the likelihood of active representation by superintendents. Past work has argued that organizational socialization produces upper-level managers with neutral preferences in regards to representing certain groups (Downs 1967; Meier and Nigro 1976; Nigro and Meier 1975; Thompson 1976). Current research, however, has found evidence that race and gender are significant predictors of policy preferences for executives in state and federal administrations (Brudney, Herbert, and Wright 2000; Dolan 2002). Meier (1993), in addition, argues that active representation is enhanced in organizations that value representation, such as by hiring minorities in order to become advocates for minority interests. Given that certain states, including Texas, and the federal government mandate educational performance levels by race, it is reasonable to expect that school systems

represent the type of organization that values minority interests, which could enhance the likelihood of active representation by upper-level managers.

Three studies of school administrators support the argument school systems are conducive environments for active representation by upper level managements. Mann (1974) found that principals and superintendents often felt they needed to be responsive to demands by constituent groups. Scott's (1990) study of Black superintendent found that along with valuing traditional bureaucratic roles, Black superintendents felt that they "must commit their expertise to the eradication of racism and the rectification of socioeconomic inequities" and should "identify with Black-directed endeavors to resolve the needs of Black needs in a racist society." (168) Finally, in her study of three Latina superintendents, Ortiz (2000) found these superintendents felt that they were appointed, in part, in order to represent the needs of Latino students. Of course, the studies mentioned above only measure attitudinal differences. The research presented here seeks to assess whether attitudinal differences actually produce different policy outputs.

#### *Evidence of linkages*

Given the qualities of bilingual education, it is not surprising that scholars have used this policy area to study representation. Recent research has found a linkage between representation and bilingual education policy outputs, arguing that these linkages were a function of active representation, by both elected officials and public servants. These studies looked at the implementation of Proposition 227, assignments to bilingual or ESL classes, and resources afforded bilingual programs.

A recent study by Bali (2003) suggests that bureaucratic representation has affected the implementation of Proposition 227. Although Proposition 227 called for an

end of bilingual education, schools could get special waivers to continue bilingual programs. The primary focus of her study is how electoral support, the percent in a district that voted for Proposition 227, affected the implementation of the proposition. In addition to studying electoral influence, she also included the race of the superintendent and percent Latino principals in her models. For these variables, she found that the presence of Latino bureaucrats increased the likelihood of districts continuing their bilingual programs.

Polinard, et al. (1990) analyzed the effect of bureaucratic representation in schools and found that Latino representation benefited Latino students. In regards to bilingual education, they found that the ratio of Percent Latino in bilingual programs over the percent of Latinos in the overall student population decreased as representation increased. Although this type of representation ratio makes sense for certain policy outcomes, such as disciplinary actions or assignments for gifted programs, it is unclear what it means in this case. A decrease in their representation ratio could be a function of placing more non-Latinos in bilingual programs, as would occur in systems with two-way bilingual education, or an increase in the percent Latino in a district, which was not properly controlled for in their models.

Two other studies assessed the effect of electoral representation, in the form of Latino representation on school boards, on bilingual program resources. Leal and Hess (2000) use data from 56 large school districts across the U.S. to study the effects of school board representation on bilingual program expenditures. They find that as Latino representation increases, so does per-pupil bilingual program expenditures. They also find a positive, and much stronger, relationship between Asian representation and

bilingual program expenditures. Although their study suggests that representation on school boards plays a role in bilingual program resource allocation, measurement issues make their results suspect. Instead of modeling per-pupil bilingual program expenditures for LEP students, they use all students. That is, the denominator in their dependent variable is all students in a district instead of the number of students enrolled in bilingual programs. Although they control from bilingual program enrollment, their results could still be a function of overall enrollment in districts. Given their sample size, 56, a few large districts could easily be driving these results.

Robinson (Robinson 2002) also studied the effect of school board representation on bilingual program resources. Taking a different approach in modeling representation, he argues that measures of representation need to be interacted with measures of need, and he comes to a completely different conclusion. That is, he finds that Latino representation on school boards leads to fewer resources being devoted to bilingual education programs. Not only do his results conflict with Leal and Hess, this study is controversial since it suggests that representation is harmful for the represented. However, as with Leal and Hess's study, Robinson's study suffers from serious measurement issues. The most serious measurement issue is that he completely misrepresents need. Instead of measuring it as the number of LEP students, those who actually need the ELL programs, he uses the number of Latino students, most of which do not need ELL programs. Although Robinson's theoretical model is an important advance in the study of representation, his empirical model fails to match his theoretical model.

This research advances the study of representation in this policy area by addressing the gaps in the research addressed above. First, I avoid the potential of an ecological fallacy by studying the decision of an individual, the superintendent. Also, I control for electoral representation, Latino representation on school boards, and pressure from below, Latino principals. Finally, I utilize Robinson's model of representation, interacting both electoral and bureaucratic representation with actual need.

### **Data and Methods**

#### *Sample*

The sample for this analysis consists of all Texas school districts with at least 20 LEP students, from the 1995-1996 school year until the 1999-2000 school year, which represents about half of all Texas school districts. The decision to limit the sample to districts with 20 or more Spanish speaking LEP students was based on two considerations. First, Texas requires districts with 20 or more LEP students in a single grade to offer ELL programs. Some districts, then, are required to offer resources toward LEP students while other districts are not. Because of this, the decision to distribute resources toward LEP students differs between districts under state mandate and those who are not. Ideally, a dummy variable could be included for districts under this mandate, but unfortunately there are no data available on whether a district falls under this mandate.

Clearly, a district with only 20 LEP students probably is not under state mandate to offer ELL programs since it is likely that these students are distributed across several grades. Although data are not available on whether a district is required to have ELL programs, the data on district LEP enrollment and bilingual and ESL teachers show that most districts, 82%, with LEP enrollment figures between 20 and 30 have bilingual or

ESL teachers. On the other hand, only 35% of districts with LEP enrollment between 1 and 20 have any bilingual or ESL teachers. The cut point of 20 LEP students, then, creates a sample where an overwhelming majority of districts have either been required to offer resources, or have at least made the decision to distribute resources in the form of certified bilingual or ESL teachers for LEP students.

The second reason for limiting the sample to districts with 20 or more Spanish speaking LEP students is that there are no Latino superintendents representing districts with fewer than 20 LEP students. As noted above, an overwhelming majority of districts with fewer than 20 LEP students do not have certified ESL or bilingual teachers. Because of this, including districts with fewer than 20 LEP students bias the results toward finding an effect of representation.

Data for this analysis come from four sources. Information on district finance, teachers, principals, superintendents, and LEP students comes from the Texas Education Agency (TEA). Latino school board membership comes from the National Association of Elected Latino Official (NALEO) and Meier et al. (2003).<sup>2</sup> Finally, data on the Latino population in the school district come from the 2000 U.S. Census.

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<sup>2</sup> NALEO keeps track of the number of Latino school board members during any given year, but does not keep track of the number of seats. The Meier et al. data set has both the number of Latino school board members, as well as the number of seats, but these data are only available for one year. Since the number of board seats is consistent across years, the NALEO count is divided by the seat count from the Meier et al. data set. This, though, produced a small number of districts with greater than 100% percent representation. It is unclear why the NALEO data set over counts Latino school board members for these districts, but to correct for this, the Latino school board member count from the Meier et al. data set was used for all the years for the particular district, in effect holding Latino representation constant for these particular districts across the 5 years.

### *Dependent Variables*

Ideally, bilingual and ESL program expenditures would be used as the dependent variable for this study, but these figures are not analyzed for two reasons. First, expenditure figures reported by the TEA do not distinguish between bilingual and ESL programs. Variations in costs should be, in part, a function in variation in program types, both between bilingual and ESL programs and between the many different types of bilingual programs (Prince and Hubert 1994). Not enough data are available to completely control for the variation in expenditures caused by program variation. Second, and most importantly, from examining the data it is clear that the reporting standards vary dramatically both across districts and across years within districts. Some districts report 10 fold increases in bilingual program expenditures from one year to the next while the number of LEP students remain relatively stable from one year to the next. It appears that part of the variation is a function of district size, such that there seems to be greater variation from one year to the next for small districts. The analysis could focus solely on large districts in order to avoid the error in expenditure data, but this strategy is not used for two reasons. First it is still unclear if there is variation in reporting across big districts as well. Second, this would constrain any inferences regarding representation to large districts.

Because of these concerns, the analyses conducted here assess the effect of representation on bilingual and ESL teacher assignments. Although funds for bilingual and ESL programs are not solely a function of teacher salaries, teacher salaries should represent an overwhelming majority of bilingual and ESL program expenditures (Robinson 2002). Also, the TEA keeps track of both the number of bilingual and ESL

certified teachers. This allows me to assess whether there is a differential effect of representation between bilingual and ESL teacher assignments. Several models of representation, then, are examined in this study. The first two models assess the effect of representation on assignment of both bilingual and ESL teachers. Subsequent models assess whether there is a differential effect from representation on the assignment of teachers for each type of ELL program.

Teacher assignment to ELL programs is modeled as both ELL teacher totals and as percent of teachers. The models predicting total bilingual and ESL teachers assess the effects of resources and representation on the level of resources available for LEP students. The models using percentage of teachers who are in bilingual and or ESL programs, on the other hand, capture tradeoffs along with responses to resources and representation. Districts can represent LEP students by hiring more teacher bilingual or ESL teachers while simultaneously hiring more teachers for other programs. In this case, representation would effect total numbers of teachers in ELL programs but not affect percentages of teachers in ELL programs. In a constrained environment, though, I would expect that addressing the need of one group, through teacher allocations, would come at a cost to other groups. By modeling both ELL teacher total and percentages, then, I can both assess if representation occurs and whether it occurs through the reallocation of resources.

For models 1 and 2, the dependent variables are the total number of ELL program teachers—both bilingual and ESL certified teachers—in a district and the percentage of ELL teachers in a district. The TEA maintains a full time equivalent measure for teachers in ELL programs. This includes bilingual certified and ESL certified teachers as well as

teachers in ELL programs who are not certified. The TEA also keeps track of bilingual certified and ESL certified teachers, but these records are counts of certified teachers in a district not full time equivalents. Certified teachers may or may not be assigned full time to ELL programs. Since I expect that Latino officials would not only be interested in hiring more teachers for ELL programs, but also be concerned hiring qualified teachers, I use counts of teachers with certification instead of the full time equivalent measure.<sup>3</sup> The percent bilingual and ESL teacher measure uses full time equivalent levels of ELL teachers since the denominator also uses the full-time equivalent for all teachers.

The final four models separate bilingual and ESL teachers. Models 3 and 4 assess the effect of represent on the count of certified bilingual teachers and the percentage of teachers who are bilingual certified. Models 5 and 6 assess the effect of representation on the count of certified ESL and the percentage of teachers who are ESL certified.

The distribution of teacher totals is heavily skewed. Because of this, the totals were logged. Several districts reported no bilingual or ESL teachers, therefore one was added to the teacher totals before they were logged. The same natural log transformations were performed on independent variables that were represented as counts—number of LEP students, number of Latino principals, and enrollment. These variables are discussed below.

### *Independent Variables*

I expect bilingual and ESL teacher assignments to be a function of need, representation, political demand/resources and financial resources. Need is measured by the logged total of Spanish speaking LEP districts in a district for the total teacher models

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<sup>3</sup> Patterns of significance and direction of the coefficients in a model predicting the full time equivalent are identical to the model predicting teacher count totals.

and the percentage of students classified LEP for the models predicting percentage of teachers in bilingual and ESL programs.

Representation is measured by the percent of school board members who are Latino and whether the superintendent is Latino. In addition to the main effects, both Latino school board representation and Latino superintendent representation measures are interacted with need. Evidence of representation would be apparent if the interactions are significant and positive in the models bilingual and ESL teacher totals. For the models of teacher percentages, positive interactions would also suggest that representation is occurring, and that is occurring through the transfer of resources from other programs toward bilingual education.

Political demand/resources are measured using the percent of the voting population who are Latino and the number or percent of teachers who are Latino. The Latino population can exert pressure on school boards, superintendents, and principals. As the Latino population increases, so should the demand for policy outputs favorable toward the Latino population; in this case resources for LEP students. Superintendents and school board members can also use the Latino population as a political resource when implementing certain policies. As noted above, districts with larger Latino populations should be more amenable to diverting resources toward bilingual education programs. The Latino population can also act as a resource for hiring qualified teachers. Although not all bilingual teachers are Latino, Latinos would be more likely to speak both Spanish and English. This measure of political resource comes from the 2000 Census, thus is constant across the years in this analysis.

Latino principals represent potential demand for bilingual education within an agency. If Latino principals favor bilingual education more than other principals, then as the number or percent of Latino principals in a district increases, so should the demand for bilingual education within districts. Latino principals can also be pivotal in hiring and retaining qualified teachers, thus acting as a resource.

The financial resources of a district are measured by the percent of district funds from local sources. As district wealth increases, usually as a function of increased property wealth, so does the availability of funds for schools. Conversely, districts with low levels of property wealth receive more of their funds from state and federal resources. Even though the state and federal governments compensate for low levels of local resources, poorer districts still lag behind in revenue totals (Wood and Theobald 2003). Districts with greater local revenue could afford to hire more teachers, regardless of program type. There should, then, be a positive relationship between financial resources and teacher total, but not necessarily a relationship between financial resources and percent ELL teachers.

In addition to the four sets of independent variables mentioned above, variable for district size was included to control for economies of scale. District size is measured by using logged student enrollment figures.

### *Methods*

Each model is estimated as a pooled time series. All models use an estimator that removes fixed effects and corrects for unit influence by year. Tobit regression is used for all the models since all the dependent variables are censored (Long 1997).

## Findings

Table 1 presents the findings for the models combining both bilingual and ESL teachers. Model 1 predicts total number of bilingual and ESL teachers, while model 2 predicts the percent of teachers who are bilingual or ESL. First, looking at resources, the models show a positive effect on both the total of ELL teachers and the percent ELL teachers for the percent voting age Latino variable. The same positive relationship exists for the percent Latino principal variable across both models. The affect of local revenue, though, differs across the two models. For the ELL teacher total model, there is a positive relation, while there is a negative relationship between local revenue and percent ELL teachers. This indicates that as local revenue goes up, we would expect to see more ELL teachers, but we would also expect to see even more general, special, or gifted education teachers.

In regards to electoral representation, the results here indicate that Latino representation on school boards leads to districts being more responsive to LEP student needs, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for the interaction variable. Holding all else equal, a district with more Latino school board representatives allocate more ELL teachers toward LEP students. That is, more teachers are allocated per LEP district as representation goes up. Looking at Model 2, it appears that representation occurs through the shifting of resources. As representation increases, so does the percent of teachers allocated to ELL programs, which implicitly implies that less resources are available for other programs. This finding supports Leal and Hess' finding, that electoral representation leads to greater resources for represented groups.

Unlike Leal and Hess' study, bureaucratic representation is also included. Even when controlling for electoral representation, I find a positive effect when there is bureaucratic representation as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for the interaction variable. There is a similar pattern to electoral representation, such that districts with Latino superintendents allocate more ELL teachers in response to need. They also devote a greater proportion of teachers to ELL programs in response to need.

Figures 1 and 2 show the effect of representation by graphing the predicted values for both total and percentage models respectively as a function of need. Figure 1 shows that the model predicts that for districts with small numbers of LEP students and a Latino superintendent, these districts are predicted as having fewer ELL students. Since these are results from logged variables, the graph is a little misleading. The actual cross over point is at approximately 100 LEP students, and below that there is a small difference in expected ELL teacher totals. Figure 2 shows that not only are districts with Latino representation expected to be more responsive to need, districts with Latino superintendents are also expected to have a greater proportion of ELL teachers for all districts.

Table 2 shows the results for models 3 and 4. Increasing the percentage of voting age Latinos leads to an increase in both bilingual teacher totals and percent bilingual teachers. The percent Latino principals variable is only significant in model 4, the percent bilingual teachers model. There is no evidence of a relationship between local revenue in either of these models.

In regards to electoral representation, the results are mixed. For the bilingual teacher total model, there is a positive and significant main effect for school board

representation, but the coefficient for the interaction variable is not significant. This indicates that although districts with representation are expected to have more bilingual teachers, they are not necessarily more responsive to changes in need. For the percent bilingual teacher model, though, the main effect of representation is not significant, but there is a positive and significant interaction effect, indicating that electoral representation leads to greater proportions of resources being devoted to bilingual education.

Bureaucratic representation also produces mixed results. There is no evidence of an effect for representation on bilingual teacher totals. Model 4, though, predicts that districts with Latino superintendents are more likely to devote a greater percentage of teachers to bilingual education in response to changes in need.

Table 3 shows the results for the last two models, 5 and 6. In regards to resources, the models show a positive effect for local revenue on both ESL teacher totals and percentages. The results for Latino voting age population indicates a negative relationship on ESL teacher totals and a negative relationship on percent ESL teachers. As for Latino principals, both models predict a negative relationship. Coupled with the results from models 1 through 4, it appears that Latino resources lead more bilingual teachers but less ESL teachers.

Electoral representation also produces a negative effect on ESL program resources. For both models, districts with more Latino school board representation devote less resources towards ESL programs in response to increases in LEP student populations. As with the Latino voting age population and Latino principals, it appears

that electoral representation leads to resources being diverted from ESL programs to bilingual programs.

Finally, bureaucratic representation is only significant in model 6, the model predicting percent ESL teachers. Districts with Latino superintendents are less responsive to changes in LEP student populations in regards to percent ESL teachers. Once again, coupled with the results presented above, bilingual program resources appear to be favored over ESL program resources in districts with representation.

### **Conclusion**

The findings here suggest that organizations with representation at the top do behave differently than those without representation. Specifically, Latino superintendents appear to be both distributing more resources toward LEP students, and diverting these resources from other education programs. Past research suggested that this was unlikely to occur. The main reason cited for lack of active representation by those at the top of public organizations is that the process of achieving upper-level management positions creates neutral bureaucrats, at least in regards to representation. However, as I argued above, socialization in public schools should enhance the linkage between passive representation and active representation. If top-level managers are appointed with the expectation of representing minority interests, then we should expect to find evidence of bureaucratic representation from organizations headed by minorities.

Of course, finding such linkages is difficult, especially when attempting to passively represent by upper-level managers with policy outcomes for represented groups. As noted above, outcomes may be affected by several factors, such as behavioral responses by non-minority bureaucrats or minority clientele. It is also likely that a

necessary condition for improved outcomes as a function of upper-level representation is that there is street-level representation. Given that street level representation is related to upper-level representation, empirical models of representation will most likely produce null results. By looking at outputs that are a direct function of upper-level management decisions, in this case ELL program resources, I avoid the problems of attempting to link representation with outcomes. Thus, I am also able to make stronger inferences regarding active representation, since the outputs studied here are not prone to behavioral responses by clientele, nor are these inferences prone to problems of ecological inference.

The results here offer strong evidence of active representation. Specifically, Latino superintendents devote more resources toward LEP students. There also appears to be difference in program types offered for LEP students in systems with Latino superintendents. That is, the ratio of bilingual to ESL teachers appears to increase in systems with Latino superintendents. Polls show that Latinos are more likely to prefer bilingual programs over ESL or submersion programs (Krashen 1996; Shin 2000). The results here suggest that Latino superintends are able to implement these preferences in the schools they administer.

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**Table 1. Tobit Regression for ELL Teacher Totals and Percentages**

	1	2
	Total ELL Teachers	% ELL Teachers
LEP Need	0.526 (32.21)	0.321 (26.18)
% Latino School Board	-0.012 (5.69)	-0.029 (4.06)
Latino SB x Need	0.002 (5.99)	0.001 (5.97)
Latino Superintendent	-0.885 (5.43)	-1.246 (2.70)
Latino Sup. x Need	0.106 (4.26)	0.037 (2.42)
Latino Principals	0.156 (6.08)	0.024 (5.14)
% Voting Age Latino	0.004 (4.15)	0.026 (4.19)
% Local Revenue	0.002 (3.37)	-0.011 (3.37)
Enrollment	0.243 (13.71)	1.120 (21.24)
1997	0.008 (0.22)	0.081 (0.39)
1998	0.058 (1.70)	0.272 (1.30)
1999	0.036 (1.05)	0.350 (1.69)
2000	0.016 (0.47)	0.342 (1.65)
Constant	-2.712 (26.54)	-8.927 (19.59)
Observations	2836	2836

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses

**Table 2. Tobit Regression for Bilingual Teacher Totals and Percentages**

	3	4
	Bilingual Teacher Totals	% Bilingual Teachers
LEP Need	0.000 (1.73)	0.286 (12.49)
% Latino School Board	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.020 (1.54)
Latino SB x Need	-0.000 (1.18)	0.001 (2.20)
Latino Superintendent	-0.417 (2.90)	-1.866 (2.31)
Latino Sup. x Need	0.000 (0.87)	0.070 (2.76)
Latino Principals	-0.108 (1.35)	0.038 (4.42)
% Pop over 18 Latino	0.052 (18.58)	0.083 (6.58)
% Local Revenue	0.003 (1.60)	-0.002 (0.27)
Enrollment	1.421 (32.99)	2.691 (25.38)
1997	0.057 (0.52)	0.096 (0.23)
1998	0.101 (0.93)	0.303 (0.74)
1999	0.100 (0.92)	0.491 (1.20)
2000	0.041 (0.38)	0.454 (1.10)
Constant	-12.634 (33.13)	-28.275 (28.18)
Observations	2836	2836


Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses

**Table 3. Tobit Regressions for ESL Teacher Totals and Percentages**

	(1)	(2)
	ESL Teacher Total	Percent ESL Teachers
LEP Need	0.000 (13.55)	0.199 (16.31)
% Latino School Board	-0.003 (2.60)	0.016 (2.20)
Latino SB x Need	-0.000 (0.41)	-0.001 (5.01)
Latino Superintendent	-0.368 (5.95)	0.821 (1.78)
Latino Sup. x Need	0.000 (3.93)	-0.082 (5.41)
Latino Principals	0.027 (0.83)	-0.018 (3.77)
% Pop over 18 Latino	0.006 (5.84)	-0.001 (0.16)
% Local Revenue	0.003 (4.78)	0.013 (4.25)
Enrollment	0.463 (33.86)	-0.593 (11.28)
1997	0.034 (0.84)	-0.030 (0.14)
1998	0.071 (1.75)	0.069 (0.33)
1999	0.053 (1.31)	-0.059 (0.28)
2000	0.060 (1.50)	-0.147 (0.71)
Constant	-2.348 (20.80)	5.639 (12.43)
Observations	2836	2836

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses

**Figure 1. Logged ELL Teacher Totals and Need**



**Figure 2. Percent ELL Teachers and Need**

